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We	  Can	  Believe	  the	  Error	  Theory	  




Bart Streumer argues that it is not possible for us to believe the error theory, where by ‘error theory’ he 
means the claim that our normative beliefs are committed to the existence of normative properties even 
though such properties do not exist. In this paper, we argue that it is indeed possible to believe the error 
theory. First, we suggest a critical improvement to Streumer’s argument. As it stands, one crucial 
premise of that argument—that we cannot have a belief while believing that there is no reason to have 
it—is implausibly strong. We argue that for his purposes, Streumer’s argument only requires a weaker 
premise, namely that we cannot rationally have a belief while believing that there is no reason to have 
it. Secondly, we go on to refute the improved argument. Even in its weaker form, Streumer’s argument 
is either invalid or the crucial premise should be rejected.	  	  
In	  his	  paper	  ‘Can	  We	  Believe	  the	  Error	  Theory?’	  (Streumer	  2013),	  Bart	  Streumer	  argues	  that	  it	  is	  not	  possible	  for	  us	  to	  believe	  the	  error	  theory	  (where	  by	  ‘error	  theory’	   he	   means	   the	   claim	   that	   our	   normative	   beliefs	   are	   committed	   to	   the	  existence	  of	  normative	  properties	  which	  do	  not	  exist).1	  Streumer	  also	  argues	  for	  several	   follow-­‐up	   claims	   to	   this	   thesis,	   such	   as	   that	   we	   can	   come	   close	   to	  believing	  the	  error	  theory	  by	  believing	  parts	  of	  it	  at	  different	  times,	  and	  that	  far	  from	   being	   a	   problem	   for	   the	   error	   theory,	   our	   inability	   to	   believe	   it	   actually	  undermines	   many	   objections	   to	   it.	   These	   ingenious	   follow-­‐up	   arguments	   are	  interesting	   in	   their	  own	  right,	  but	  we	  shall	  not	  address	   them	  here.	   Instead,	  we	  concentrate	   on	   Streumer’s	   core	   claim	   and	   show	   that	   he	   has	   given	   us	   no	   good	  reason	  – normative	  or	  otherwise	  – to	  doubt	  that	  we	  can	  believe	  the	  error	  theory.	  
                                                
1 Throughout, page numbers within parentheses refer to this paper. 
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Whether	  we	  should	  do	  so	  or	  not	  is	  a	  separate	  question.	  We	  take	  no	  view	  either	  way	  in	  this	  paper. 
 
The	  paper	  has	  three	  parts.	  In	  the	  first	  part,	  we	  lay	  out	  Streumer’s	  central	  claims.	  In	   the	  second	  part,	  we	  suggest	  a	  critical	   improvement	   to	  Streumer’s	  argument.	  As	  it	  stands,	  one	  crucial	  premise	  of	  that	  argument	  – that	  we	  cannot	  have	  a	  belief	  while	  believing	   there	   is	  no	   reason	   to	  have	   it	  –	   is	   implausibly	   strong.	  We	  argue	  that	   for	   his	   purposes,	   Streumer’s	   argument	   only	   requires	   a	   weaker	   premise,	  namely	   that	  we	   cannot	   rationally	   have	  a	  belief	  while	  believing	   that	   there	   is	  no	  reason	  to	  have	   it.	   In	   the	  third	  part,	  we	  go	  on	  to	  refute	   the	   improved	  argument.	  Even	   in	   its	  weaker	   form,	   Streumer’s	   argument	   is	   either	   invalid,	   or	   the	   crucial	  premise	  should	  be	  rejected. 
 
1.	  The	  claim	  
 The	  error	   theory	  at	   issue	   in	  Streumer’s	  paper	   is	  a	  ‘global’	  error	   theory.	  On	  his	  use	  of	  the	  term,	  an	  ‘error	  theory’	  is	  a	  theory	  claiming	  that	  “normative	  judgments	  are	  beliefs	  that	  ascribe	  normative	  properties,	  even	  though	  such	  properties	  do	  not	  exist.”	  (p.	  194) 
 In	  other	  words,	  Streumer’s	  error	  theory	  is	  not	  restricted	  to	  substantively	  moral	  properties	  and	  relations	  (as	  in	  John	  Mackie’s	  infamous	  ‘moral	  error	  theory’),	  but	  is	  meant	  to	  apply	  to	  all	  normative	  properties	  and	  relations.	   In	  particular,	   if	   the	  so-­‐called	  ‘reason	  relation’	  (i.e.	  the	  relation	  of	  some	  fact	  in	  the	  world	  favouring	  a	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certain	   response	   on	   our	   part,	   whether	   that	   response	   is	   a	   belief,	   attitude	   or	  action)	  is	  a	  normative	  relation,	  then	  all	  its	  putative	  instances	  fall	  within	  the	  scope	  of	  the	  error	  theory.	   
 
Streumer’s	   argument	   goes	   as	   follows.	   If	   the	   error	   theory	   is	   true,	   there	   are	   no	  reasons.	   If	   there	  are	  no	  reasons,	   there	   is	  no	  reason	  to	  believe	   the	  error	   theory.	  According	  to	  Streumer,	  we	  cannot	  fail	  to	  believe	  what	  we	  believe	  to	  be	  entailed	  by	  our	  own	  beliefs.	  But	  if	  we	  believe	  the	  error	  theory,	  we	  must	  believe	  that	  there	  is	   no	   reason	   to	   have	   that	   belief.	   Yet,	   according	   to	   Streumer,	  we	   cannot	   have	   a	  belief	  while	  believing	  there	  is	  no	  reason	  to	  have	  that	  belief.	  So	  we	  cannot	  believe	  the	  error	  theory. 
 
For	  our	  purposes,	  the	  crucial	  premise	  of	  Streumer’s	  argument	  is	  the	  following	  (p.	  196): 
 
(BELIEF)	  We	  cannot	  have	  a	  belief	  while	  believing	  that	  there	  is	  no	  reason	  for	  this	  belief. 
 
In	  BELIEF,	  Streumer	  tells	  us,	  ‘belief’	  should	  be	  read	  as	  ‘full	  belief’,	  which	  in	  turn	  is	   explicated	   in	   terms	   of	   confidence:	   “We	   fully	  believe	   that	   p	   if	   we	   are	  wholly	  confident	   that	   p,	   and	   we	   partly	  believe	   that	   p	   if	   we	   are	   fairly	   but	   not	   wholly	  confident	   that	   p.”	   (p.	   195)	   Apart	   from	   when	   we	   explicitly	   want	   to	   stress	   the	  adjective,	  we	  will	  follow	  Streumer’s	  convention	  and	  use	  ‘belief’	  as	  short	  for	  ‘full	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belief’.	  Streumer	  argues	  that	  a	  consequence	  of	  the	  error	  theory	  is	  that	  there	  is	  no	  reason	  to	  believe	  it	  (p.	  197):	  
 
The	  property	  of	  being	  a	  reason	  for	  belief,	   in	  the	  sense	  of	  a	  consideration	  that	  counts	  in	  favor	  of	  a	  belief,	  is	  a	  normative	  property.	  If	  the	  error	  theory	  is	   true,	   this	   property	   does	   not	   exist.	   The	   error	   theory	   therefore	   entails	  that	  there	  is	  no	  reason	  to	  believe	  the	  error	  theory.	  
 
Given	   that,	   according	   to	   BELIEF,	   we	   cannot	   have	   a	   belief	   while	   believing	   that	  there	   is	   no	   reason	   to	   have	   it,	   Streumer	   concludes	   that	   we	   cannot	   believe	   the	  error	  theory. 
 
2.	  The	  premise	  
 We	   first	   take	   issue	   with	   BELIEF.	   This	   premise	   of	   Streumer’s	   argument	   is	  implausibly	  strong.	  	   
 
Belief	  is	  a	  psychological	  state.	  We	  believe	  that	  p	  if	  we	  are	  wholly	  confident	  that	  p.	  But	  if	  so,	  whether	  someone	  can	  have	  a	  belief	  while	  believing	  there	  is	  no	  reason	  to	  have	   this	  belief	   is	  partly	  an	  empirical	  question.	  Streumer	  argues	   for	  BELIEF	  by	  appealing	  to	  intuitions	  about	  what	  we	  may	  plausible	  assert	  (p.	  196): 
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[S]uppose	  that	  someone	  says:	  “Socrates	  was	  mortal,	  but	  there	  is	  no	  reason	  to	  believe	  that	  Socrates	  was	  mortal.”	  [T]his	  person	  may	  be	  insincere,	  or	  may	  fail	  to	   understand	  what	  he	   is	   saying,	   or	  may	  be	   considering	  whether	   to	   give	  up	  one	  of	  these	  beliefs.	   If	  so,	  he	  does	  not	  fully	  believe	  what	  he	  says	  he	  believes.	  Alternatively,	  he	  may	  be	  sincere,	  may	  understand	  what	  he	  is	  saying,	  and	  may	  not	  be	  considering	  whether	  to	  give	  up	  one	  of	  these	  beliefs.	  But	  if	  so,	  he	  is	  too	  confused	  to	  fully	  believe	  what	  he	  says	  he	  believes.	  
	  
Given	   that	   ‘belief’	   in	   BELIEF	  means	   ‘full	   belief’,	   Streumer	  might	   be	   right	   that	  someone	   who	   doubts,	   or	   is	   not	   sincere,	   or	   does	   not	   understand	   what	   she	   is	  saying	  would	  not	  count	  as	  fully	  believing	  what	  she	  says.	  But	  given	  that	  a	  sincere	  speaker	  who	  understands	  the	  content	  of	  p	  only	  needs	  to	  be	  fully	  confident	  that	  p	  in	   order	   to	   fully	   believe	   that	   p,	   the	   issue	  of	   rationality	   (the	   speaker	  being	   ‘too	  confused’)	   is	   irrelevant	   to	   the	   question	   of	   what	   the	   speaker	   actually	   believes	  with	   respect	   to	   the	   individual	   proposition	   p	   (the	   case	   could	   be	   different	   with	  respect	  to	  the	  very	  different	  question	  of	  whether	  the	  speaker	  has	  any	  beliefs	  at	  all).	  Hence,	  Streumer	  has	  not	  provided	  a	  convincing	  case	  for	  BELIEF.	  So	  should	  we	  believe	  in	  BELIEF?	  What	  we	  need	  is	  a	  case	  where	  someone	  could,	  as	  a	  matter	  of	  fact,	  have	  full	  confidence	  in	  a	  proposition	  while	  also	  having	  full	  confidence	  in	  the	  proposition	  that	  there	  are	  no	  reasons	  in	  favour	  of	  it	  (we	  take	  it	  as	  granted	  on	  both	  sides	  that	  a	  belief	  that	  P	  is	  not	  in	  itself	  considered	  as	  a	  reason	  for	  P	  (at	  least	  not	  in	  this	  case)).	  We	  can	  think	  of	  at	  least	  two	  possible	  candidates	  for	  this	  role.	  The	  first	  involves	  religious	  belief.	  The	  second	  involves	  beliefs	  about	  the	  future. 
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First,	  consider	  a	  religiously	  devout	  person,	  Soren,	  who	  is	  confident	  that	  there	  is	  a	  God,	  but	  is	  also	  firmly	  committed	  to	  the	  claims	  of	  natural	  science.	  Soren	  is	  fully	  confident	  that	   the	  supernatural	  properties	  of	  God	  (His	  being	  able	  to	  do	  at	   least	  whatever	   is	   logically	   possible;	   His	   knowing	   all	   things	   future	   and	   present;	   His	  being	  infinitely	  benevolent,	  and	  all	  the	  rest	  of	  it)	  are	  not	  compatible	  with	  what	  he	  takes	  to	  be	  the	  implications	  of	  natural	  science.	  Hence,	  he	  concludes,	  and	  has	  full	  confidence	  in	  the	  conclusion,	  that	  there	  is	  no	  reason	  to	  believe	  in	  God’s	  existence.	  Even	   so,	   Soren	   has	   absolute	   faith	   in	   God’s	   existence.	   Streumer	   denies	   this	  possibility.	  Perhaps	  he	  could	  object	  that	  faith	  is	  not	  belief.	  But	  all	  that	  is	  required	  on	  Streumer’s	  view	  for	  someone	  to	  have	  a	  belief	  is	  that	  her	  attitude	  is	  one	  of	  full	  confidence,	   and	   that	   is	   exactly	   what	   Soren	   has	   in	   the	   existence	   of	   God.	   Given	  some	  of	  the	  things	  that	  are	  at	  stake	  in	  matters	  of	  faith	  it	  is	  hardly	  surprising	  that	  someone’s	  level	  of	  confidence	  in	  a	  religious	  proposition	  can	  vary	  independently	  of	   reasons	   they	   take	   to	   exist	   in	   favour	   of	   its	   truth.	   To	   think	   otherwise	   is	   to	  confuse	  the	  (hopeful)	  belief	  that	  God	  exists	  with	  the	  belief	  that	  He	  has	  provided	  us	  with	  reasons	   to	  believe	   in	  His	  existence.	  Whether	  He	  either	  could	  or	  should	  provide	   us	   with	   such	   reasons	   is	   a	   matter	   of	   theological	   dispute.	   It	   is	   not	   an	  independently	  accessible	  ‘datum’	  that	  we	  can	  use	  to	  determine	  whether	  or	  not	  it	  is	  possible	  to	  self-­‐consciously	  hold	  a	  groundless	  belief	  in	  God’s	  existence. 
 
Second,	  consider	  a	  philosophy	  student	  who	  has	  just	  spent	  a	  week	  reading	  Hume	  on	   the	   problem	   of	   induction.	   As	   a	   result,	   he	   has	   become	   fully	   convinced	   that	  there	  is	  no	  reason	  to	  believe	  that	  the	  sun	  will	  rise	  tomorrow;	  that	  the	  future	  will	  resemble	  the	  past,	  and	  all	  the	  rest	  of	   it.	  Yet,	   just	   like	  Hume,	  when	  he	  leaves	  the	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study	   he	   finds	   himself	   surprisingly	   confident	   in	   all	   the	   beliefs	   that	   his	  philosophical	  efforts	  have	  convinced	  him	  are	  entirely	  groundless.	  (Or	  perhaps	  he	  has	   been	   reading	   Nietzsche	   on	   the	   genealogy	   of	   morals	   and	   has	   become	   fully	  convinced	   that	   there	   is	   no	   reason	   to	   believe	   in	   the	   conceptually	   articulated	  products	   of	   ressentiment,	   ‘slave	   morality’,	   or	   the	   will	   to	   power.	   Yet	   once	   he	  leaves	   his	   study,	   he	   can’t	   help	   feeling	   confident	   that	   justice	  will	  meet	  with	   its	  reward;	   that	   everything	   will	   be	   all	   right	   in	   the	   end;	   that	   the	   strong	   will	   be	  victorious,	   and	   all	   the	   rest	   of	   it.)	   Irrational	   though	   it	   may	   be,	   we	   think	   it	   is	  possible	   for	  him	  to	  be	  fully	  confident	   in	  at	   least	  some	  of	   these	  beliefs,	  while	  on	  reflection	  being	  willing	   to	  admit	   that	   they	  are	  beliefs	   for	  which	  he	  has,	  and	   for	  which	  there	  either	  are,	  or	  can	  be,	  no	  ‘good’,	  ‘genuine’,	  or	  ‘normative’	  reasons. 
 
In	  sum,	  we	  think	  there	  are	  several	  plausible	  violations	  of	  BELIEF.	  Depending	  on	  contingent	   facts	  about	  our	  psychology,	  we	  may	  or	  may	  not	  be	  able	  to	  entertain	  some	  strange	  combinations	  of	  beliefs	  (like	  the	  ones	  above),	  not	  only	  at	  different	  times	  and	   in	  different	  circumstances	  (as	  Streumer	  might	   insist	   is	   the	  case	  with	  the	   inductive	   skeptic),	   but	   also	   simultaneously	   and	   in	   the	   same	   circumstances	  (as	   in	   the	   case	   of	   someone	   contemplating	   the	   existence	   of	   a	   Higher	   Being).	  Placing	  all	  the	  weight	  on	  the	  premise	  that	  human	  psychology	  is	  such	  that	  we	  are	  never	  able	  to	  believe	  that	  p	  once	  we	  judge	  that	  there	  is	  no	  reason	  to	  believe	  that	  p	  is	  a	  bad	  bet	  for	  a	  defender	  of	  Streumer’s	  argument.	  
	  
This	   problem	   can	   be	   overcome.	  We	   can	   replace	   BELIEF	   in	   Streumer’s	   original	  argument	  by	  the	  slightly	  weaker	  premise,	  BELIEF*:	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(BELIEF*)	  We	  cannot	  rationally	  have	  a	  belief	  while	  believing	  that	  there	  is	  no	  reason	  for	  this	  belief. 
	  
For	   our	   purposes	   in	   this	   paper,	  we	   interpret	   ‘rationality’	   as	   a	   content	   neutral	  notion	   that	   implies	   consistency	   (including	   instrumental	   consistency)	  among	  an	  agent’s	   attitudes	   and	   any	   formal	   relations	   of	   coherence	   that	   obtain	   between	  them.	   To	   say	   that	   something	   is	   rational	   in	   this	   sense	   is	   not	   to	   attribute	   a	  normative	   property	   to	   it	   in	   Streumer’s	   sense.	   The	   fact	   that	   an	   agent	   cannot	  consistently	   entertain	   two	   or	  more	   attitudes	   does	   not	   settle	  which	   among	   the	  offending	  attitudes	  the	  agent	  ought	  to	  give	  up.	  	  
	  
We	   take	   this	   revision	   of	   BELIEF	   to	   be	   friendly	   to	   Streumer’s	   project.	   Indeed,	  Streumer	  himself	   explicitly	   entertains	   the	   idea	   that	  BELIEF	  may	  not	  be	   true	  of	  compulsive	   beliefs,	   and	   even	   suggests	   that	  we	  may	   have	   to	   restrict	   BELIEF	   to	  non-­‐compulsive	   beliefs	   only	   (he	   correctly	   points	   out	   that	   belief	   in	   the	   error	  theory	   is	   non-­‐compulsive).	   We	   suggest	   that	   a	   better	   formulation	   of	   this	   (and	  related)	  caveats	  is	  captured	  by	  our	  BELIEF*.	  	  
	  
If	  Streumer	  accepts	  our	  weaker	  premise,	  his	  argument	  does	  not	   fail	  as	   soon	  as	  someone	  manages	   to	  produce	  an	  example	  of	   a	  person	  who	   is	   able	   to	  entertain	  the	  sets	  of	  beliefs	   that	  BELIEF	   forbids,	  and	  he	  can	  still	  pursue	  –	  with	   the	  same	  degree	   of	   plausibility,	   it	   seems	   to	   us	   –	   analogous	   follow-­‐up	   arguments	   to	   the	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effect	   that	   we	   can	   coherently	   believe	   different	   parts	   of	   the	   error	   theory	   at	  different	   times,	   and	   that	   the	   inability	   to	   rationally	   believe	   the	   error	   theory	  undermines	  several	  arguments	  against	  it.	  Indeed,	  if	  we	  cannot	  rationally	  believe	  the	   error	   theory,	   this	   could	   provide	   an	   explanation	   of	   why	   it	   is	   so	   hard	   for	  philosophers	   to	   accept	   it,	   an	   explanation	   that	   would	   be	   analogous	   to	   more	  familiar	   explanations	   of	   why	   it	   is	   so	   hard	   for	   philosophers	   to	   accept	   other	  apparently	  paradoxical	  positions,	  such	  as	  inductive	  skepticism.	  In	  our	  view,	  this	  would	  be	  a	  more	  convincing	  account	  of	  the	  data	  than	  the	  implausibly	  strong	  view	  that	  we	  simply	  cannot	  believe	  these	  apparently	  paradoxical	  claims.	  
 
At	   this	   point	   it	   might	   be	   objected	   that	   of	   course	   our	   religious	   believer	   and	  inductive	  skeptic	  take	  themselves	  to	  have	  reasons	  to	  have	  their	  beliefs,	  only	  not	  epistemic	   reasons	   to	   believe	   the	   relevant	   propositions,	   but	   rather	   practical	  reasons	  to	  make	  themselves	  believe	  them	  (or	  some	  alternative	  that	  falls	  short	  of	  taking	  there	  to	  be	  reasons	   in	   favour	  of	   the	  content	  of	   the	  relevant	  belief).	   If	  so,	  our	   examples	   are	   not	   relevantly	   analogous	   to	   that	   of	   an	   error	   theorist,	   who	  would	  have	  to	  believe	  that	  he	  has	  no	  reasons,	  epistemic	  or	  practical,	   to	  believe	  the	  error	  theory.	  	  
	  
We	  agree	  that	  people	  can	  form	  beliefs	  in	  ways	  that	  are	  unrelated	  to	  the	  truth	  of	  those	  beliefs,	  as	  a	  result	  of	  wishful	  thinking,	  sheer	  stubbornness,	  or	  the	  desire	  to	  win	  a	  philosophical	  argument,	  for	  example.	  Yet	  we	  don’t	  see	  the	  case	  for	  insisting	  that	   the	   resulting	   beliefs	   could	   never	   be	   accompanied	   by	   a	   further	   belief	   that	  really	  these	  beliefs	  are	  ones	  the	  agent	  has	  no	  genuine	  reason	  to	  hold.	  Of	  course,	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such	  people	  would	  be	  rationally	  divided	  against	  themselves	  and	  to	  that	  extent	  be	  less	  than	  fully	  rational.	  But	  that	  is	  just	  to	  say	  that	  we	  should	  replace	  BELIEF	  by	  BELIEF*,	  which	  is	  what	  we	  have	  suggested	  above.	  
 
With	  BELIEF	  replaced	  by	  BELIEF*,	  Streumer’s	  argument	  is	  less	  implausible.	  Yet	  it	  is	  still	  very	  implausible,	  as	  we	  will	  now	  show. 
 
3.	  The	  argument	  
 In	   its	  modified	   version,	   Streumer’s	   argument	   goes	   like	   this:	   because	   the	   error	  theorist	   denies	   that	   there	   are	   any	   normative	   properties	   and	   relations,	   and	  because	  the	  existence	  of	  reasons	   implies	  the	  existence	  of	  normative	  properties,	  she	   must	   deny	   that	   there	   are	   any	   reasons.	   Consequently,	   she	   must	   deny	   that	  there	   is	   any	   reason	   to	  believe	   the	  error	   theory,	   and,	   according	   to	  BELIEF*,	   she	  then	  cannot	  rationally	  believe	  the	  error	  theory. 
 
By	   evaluating	  BELIEF*	   from	   the	  perspective	   of	   the	   error	   theorist,	  we	  will	   now	  demonstrate	   that	   Streumer’s	   argument	   faces	   a	   dilemma.	   Either	   BELIEF*	  (suitably	   interpreted)	   is	   true.	   Yet	   in	   that	   case	   it	   does	   not	   prevent	   the	   error	  theorist	   from	   believing	   the	   error	   theory.	   Alternatively,	   BELIEF*	   (suitably	  interpreted)	  would	   prevent	   the	   error	   theorist	   from	  believing	   the	   error	   theory.	  Yet	  in	  that	  case,	  any	  sensible	  error	  theorist	  will	  deny	  it. 
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The	   dilemma	   stems	   from	   an	   equivocation	   on	   Streumer’s	   part	   concerning	   the	  term	   ‘reason	   for	   belief’.	   It	   is	   used	   by	   Streumer	   to	  mean	   “a	   consideration	   that	  counts	  in	  favour	  of	  a	  belief.”	  (p.	  196) In	  arguing	  for	  his	  conclusion,	  Streumer	  fails	  to	   show	   that	   the	   terms	   ‘reason	   for	   belief’	   and	   ‘counting	   in	   favour	   of’	   can	   be	  coherently	   understood	   in	   a	   way	   required	   both	   for	   the	   premise	   to	   remain	  plausible	  and	  the	  argument	  to	  go	  through.	   
 
On	   the	   first	   horn	   of	   the	   dilemma,	   Streumer’s	   characterisation	   of	   a	   reason	   for	  belief	   in	   BELIEF*	   is	   interpreted	   as	   expressing	   the	   commonsense	   idea	   that	  something	  is	  a	  reason	  for	  p	  when	  it	  counts	  in	  favour	  of	  p.	  On	  this	  interpretation,	  it	   seems	   that	   evidence	   can	   count	   as	   reasons	   (e.g.	   in	   the	   form	  of	  data	  making	  a	  hypothesis	  more	  probable	  or	  philosophical	  arguments	  entailing	  a	  conclusion).	  It	  is	   also	   on	   this	   interpretation	   that	   BELIEF*	   is	   most	   plausible.	   Yet	   on	   this	  interpretation,	   BELIEF*	   does	   not	   prevent	   the	   error	   theorist	   from	  believing	   the	  error	   theory.	   For	   while	   the	   error	   theorist	   must	   deny	   that	   there	   are	   any	  normative	  properties	  and	  relations,	  she	  is	  not	  thereby	  forced	  to	  deny	  that	  there	  is	  good	  evidence	  in	  favour	  of	  the	  error	  theory.	  What	  we	  can	  do,	  on	  her	  account,	  is	  take	   the	  relevant	  evidence	   to	  count	   in	   favour	  of	   the	  error	   theory	  but	  deny	  that	  the	   existence	   of	   this	   evidence	   implies	   the	   further	   existence	   of	   the	   normative	  properties	  and	  relations	  the	  error	  theory	  denies.	  (The	  question	  if	  we	  really	  need	  these	  further	  entities	  to	  make	  sense	  of	  our	  beliefs	  is	  one	  we	  return	  to	  below.)	  On	  the	  first	  horn	  of	  the	  dilemma,	  therefore,	  the	  error	  theorist	  can	  rationally	  believe	  the	  error	  theory.	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It	  might	  be	  objected	  that	   in	  making	  this	  claim	  we	  are	  missing	  the	  target.	  For	  at	  this	   point	   in	   his	   argument,	   Streumer	   explicitly	   assumes	   that	   “the	   normative	  judgment	   that	   there	   is	   a	   reason	   for	   a	   belief...”	   is	   “a	   belief	   that	   ascribes	   a	  normative	   property”,	   from	  which	   he	   claims	   it	   follows	   that	   those	  who	   come	   to	  believe	   the	   error	   theory	   on	   the	   basis	   of	   the	   evidence	   (as	  we	   suggest)	   “do	   not	  believe	   an	   error	   theory	   about	   all	   normative	   judgments,	   but	   instead	   believe	   a	  more	   limited	   error	   theory”	   (p.	   198).	   We	   think	   this	   inference	   is	   too	   quick.	  Naturally,	  if	  the	  notion	  of	  a	  'normative	  judgment'	  is	  understood	  broadly	  enough	  to	  include	  the	  formation	  of	  beliefs	  in	  a	  way	  that	  does	  not	  imply	  the	  existence	  of	  normative	  properties,	  then	  Streumer	  could	  be	  right.	  Yet	  the	  disputed	  question,	  as	  we	  see	  it,	   is	  not	  about	  normative	   judgments	  thus	  broadly	  construed,	  but	  rather	  about	   normative	   judgments	   construed	   as	   implying	   the	   existence	   of	   normative	  properties.	   Thus	   construed,	   we	   are	   unable	   to	   agree	   with	   Streumer.	   This	   is	  because	  we	  are	   inclined	   to	   reject	  his	   assumption	   that	   in	   coming	   to	  believe	   the	  error	   theory	  we	   are	   thereby	   necessarily	   'ascribing	   a	   normative	   property',	   and	  thereby	  coming	  to	  believe	  in	  the	  existence	  of	  normative	  properties.	  (What	  we	  are	  doing	   is	   forming	   a	   second	   order	   belief,	   on	   the	   basis	   of	   the	   evidence,	   that	  normative	   judgements	   imply	   a	   commitment	   to	   the	   existence	   of	   normative	  properties,	  and	  that	  such	  properties	  do	  not	  exist.)	  If	  we	  are	  right	  about	  this,	  the	  objection	   fails.	   If	  we	   are	   not,	   then	  we	   are	   forced	   on	   to	   the	   second	   horn	   of	   the	  dilemma,	  to	  which	  we	  now	  turn.	  
	  On	   the	   second	   horn	   of	   the	   dilemma,	   the	   reason	   relation	   in	   BELIEF*	   should	   be	  understood	   as	   a	   normative	   relation.	   On	   this	   interpretation,	   the	   question	   is	  whether	   the	   error	   theorist	   can	   rationally	   believe	   the	   error	   theory	   while	   also	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believing	   that	   there	   are	   no	   normative	   relations	   favouring	   that	   belief.	   Adopting	  this	   interpretation	   undermines	   the	   improved	   version	   of	   Streumer's	   argument.	  According	   to	   the	   error	   theorist,	   there	   are	   no	   such	   relations.	   According	   to	  Streumer's	   argument,	   we	   cannot	   rationally	   believe	   that	   there	   are	   no	   such	  relations	  if	  the	  error	  theory	  is	  true.	  Yet	  the	  sense	  in	  which	  we	  cannot	  rationally	  believe	   this	   is	   not	   the	   broad	   sense,	   according	   to	  which	   evidence	   is	   allowed	   to	  count	   in	   favour	  of	  a	  belief.	   Instead,	  we	  are	  supposed	   to	  be	  unable	   to	   rationally	  believe	   that	   there	   are	   no	   such	   relations	   in	   the	   specific	   sense	   described	   in	  BELIEF**:	  
 
(BELIEF**)	  We	  cannot	  rationally	  have	  a	  belief	  while	  believing	  that	  there	  is	  no	  consideration	  with	  a	  normative	  property	  of	  counting	  in	  favour	  for	  that	  belief. 
 
Thus	   interpreted,	   Streumer’s	   argument	   crumbles.	   For	  BELIEF**	   is	   a	   claim	   that	  any	  sensible	  error	  theorist	  will	  deny.	  Any	  sensible	  error	  theorist	  will	  insist	  that	  we	  can	  absolutely	  believe	  something	  when	  there	  is	  good	  evidence	  for	  that	  thing,	  and	  that	  good	  evidence	  (in	  the	  form	  of	  philosophical	  arguments)	  is	  exactly	  what	  we	  have	   for	   the	   error	   theory.	   If	  we	   are	   convinced	   that	   there	   are	  no	  normative	  relations	  counting	   in	   favour	  of	  belief	   in	   the	  error	   theory,	   then	  we	  obviously	  do	  not	  believe	  in	  them.	  Yet	  all	  that	  shows	  is	  that	  we	  can	  believe	  the	  error	  theory	  on	  the	  basis	  of	   the	  evidence,	  not	  on	   the	  basis	  of	   an	  erroneous	  belief	   in	  properties	  and	  relations	  that	  do	  not	  exist.	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Our	   initial	  conclusion	   is	   therefore	   that	  BELIEF*	   is	  only	  plausible	   if	  we	  read	   the	  counting	   in	   favour	   of	   relation	   (and	   thus	   the	   reason	   relation)	   in	   a	   broad	   and	  ecumenical	  way.	  If	  we	  do	  so,	  BELIEF*	  does	  not	  prohibit	  the	  error	  theorist	   from	  rationally	  believing	  the	  error	  theory.	  Yet	  if	  we	  do	  not,	  and	  we	  interpret	  BELIEF*	  as	  BELIEF**,	   any	   sensible	  error	   theorist	  will	  deny	   its	   truth.	   So	  either	  way,	   it	   is	  possible	   to	   rationally	   believe	   the	   error	   theory	   (which	   is	   not	   to	   say	   that	   we	  should). 
	  At	  this	  point,	   it	  might	  be	  objected	  that	  to	  form	  a	  belief	  on	  the	  basis	  of	  evidence	  for	  it	  (or	  any	  other	  consideration	  for	  that	  matter),	  according	  to	  the	  error	  theorist,	  
just	  is	  to	  form	  a	  belief	  on	  the	  basis	  of	  taking	  there	  to	  be	  a	  normative	  counting-­‐in-­‐favour-­‐of	  relation	  between	  the	  relevant	  evidence	  (or	  any	  other	  consideration	  for	  that	  matter)	  and	  that	  belief.	  This	   is	  arguably	  the	  response	  that	  Streumer	  has	   in	  mind	  when	  he	  writes	   that	  “we	  cannot	  base	  a	  belief	  on	  a	  consideration	  without	  making	  at	  least	  an	  implicit	  normative	  judgment”	  (p.	  199),	  and	  that	  he	  cannot	  see	  the	  evidence	  for	  a	  belief	  as	  “merely	  causing”,	  or	  “merely	  explaining”	  why	  he	  has	  a	   belief	   (p.	   198).	   Although	   we	   doubt	   whether	   it	   is	   plausible	   to	   describe	   the	  theoretical	  options	  here	  in	  terms	  of	  an	  exhaustive	  dichotomy,	  let	  us	  assume	  for	  the	   sake	   of	   argument	   that	   the	   available	   theoretical	   options	   are	   either	   'mere'	  causation	  or	   'mere'	  explanation	  on	  the	  one	  hand,	  or	  the	  existence	  of	  normative	  properties	  on	  the	  other.	  Once	  we	  do,	  our	  original	  route	  to	  the	  conclusion	  that	  we	  can	  rationally	  believe	  the	  error	  theory	  would	  seem	  to	  be	  blocked.	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In	   response,	   we	   offer	   a	   slightly	   weaker	   version	   of	   the	   original	   argument.	   To	  contemplate	  the	  truth	  of	  the	  error	  theory	  on	  the	  assumption	  that	  to	  form	  a	  belief	  on	  the	  basis	  of	  evidence	  for	  it	  just	  is	  to	  form	  a	  belief	  on	  the	  basis	  of	  taking	  there	  to	   be	   reasons	   in	   its	   favour	   is	   to	   contemplate	   the	   possibility	   that	   all	   reflective	  belief	  formation	  implies	  a	  commitment	  to	  normative	  properties	  that	  don’t	  exist.	  Now	   this	  kind	  of	   error	   theory	  about	   reflective	  belief	   formation	  might	  or	  might	  not	  be	  true	  (we	  make	  no	  claims	  either	  way	  in	  this	  paper).	  Yet	  whichever	  way	  it	  is,	  there	   is	  nothing	   to	   stop	   someone	   from	  being	   fully	   confident	   in	   its	   truth	  on	   the	  basis	   of	   a	   philosophical	   argument.	   By	   hypothesis,	   a	   person	   who	   were	   thus	  confident	  would	  be	  rationally	  divided	  against	  him	  or	  herself.	  To	  that	  extent,	  his	  or	  her	  beliefs	  would	  not	  be	  fully	  rational.	  Yet	  (as	  we	  argued	  in	  Section	  2),	  the	  fact	  that	  I	  cannot	  rationally	  hold	  a	  belief	  does	  not	  entail	  that	  I	  cannot	  hold	  that	  belief.	  So	  even	  if	  to	  form	  a	  belief	  on	  the	  basis	  of	  evidence	  just	  is	  to	  form	  a	  belief	  on	  the	  basis	   of	   taking	   there	   to	   be	   reasons	   in	   its	   favour,	  we	   can	   still	   believe	   the	   error	  theory,	  only	  now	  at	  the	  cost	  of	  our	  beliefs	  not	  being	  fully	  rational.	  	  
Our	   alternative	   conclusion	   is	   therefore	   as	   follows.	   If	   reflective	  belief	   formation	  does	  not	  imply	  a	  commitment	  to	  the	  existence	  of	  normative	  properties,	  then	  we	  can	  rationally	  believe	  the	  error	  theory.	  If	  reflective	  belief	  formation	  does	  imply	  a	  commitment	   to	   the	  existence	  of	  normative	  properties,	   then	  we	   can	  believe	   the	  error	   theory,	   but	   only	   at	   the	   cost	   of	   our	   beliefs	   not	   being	   fully	   rational.	   Either	  way,	  we	   can	  believe	   the	   error	   theory	   (which,	   once	  more,	   is	   not	   to	   say	   that	  we	  should).	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